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ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, the music industry has suffered
unprecedented piracy and digital music has become
increasingly prevalent on illegal websites. In response, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has
filed lawsuits against many alleged copyright infringers
who have illegally downloaded music from the Internet. A
few of these alleged infringers, in an effort to reduce
damages, claimed they were “innocent infringers.” Several
courts ruled that the innocent infringer defense did not
apply, based on 17 U.S.C. § 402(d), which precludes the
defense if proper copyright notice appears on
“phonorecords” (e.g., compact discs). The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in one such case, Harper v. Maverick
Recording Co., but Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissent,
arguing that certiorari should have been granted to
address whether notice published on phonorecords applies
to copyright infringement cases involving music
downloaded from the Internet. Justice Alito’s dissent raises
an important question: should the innocent infringer
defense be unavailable as a matter of law in music
downloading cases if copyright notice is available on
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physical media to which the downloaders may never have
had access? This Article explores this issue by examining
Justice Alito’s dissent and considering whether the Court
should address the applicability of § 402(d) in music
downloading cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Total revenue in the music business has dropped from $14.6
billion in 1999 to $6.3 billion in 2009. 1 Although many factors
have contributed to the music industry’s financial decline—the rise
of online streaming services, the increased availability of podcasts,
and the iTunes model of single-song downloads—the increase in
online music piracy has been a primary factor. Some individuals
have largely stopped purchasing albums and instead illegally
download music online free of charge. For years, the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) fought back directly,
suing over 35,000 people. 2 Many individuals settled, recognizing
1

David Godlen, Music’s lost decade: Sales cut in half in 2000s,
CNNMONEY (Feb. 3, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/
companies/napster_music_industry.
2
Ashby Jones, Copy-wrong! Unpacking the 1.92M Downloading Verdict,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 27, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/
06/27/copy-wrong-unpacking-the-192m-downloading-verdict/.
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they were caught “red handed” in a clear case of copyright
infringement. Some chose to fight back, claiming that any damages
should be reduced because they were “innocent infringers” because
they were “not aware and had no reason to believe that their acts
constituted an infringement of copyright.” 3
Generally, defendants may assert the innocent infringer defense
in copyright litigation. Although innocent infringers are still liable
for damages, a court may reduce those damages if the defendant
can demonstrate that he or she is an innocent infringer. However,
under 17 U.S.C. § 402(d), the defense is not available when a
defendant has copied phonorecords that contain a proper copyright
notice.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered the
innocent infringer defense in Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper.4
In Harper, the 16-year-old defendant claimed that her
downloading of 37 songs was innocent because she did not
understand that copyrights on published music applied to music
downloaded off the Internet. The court disagreed, stating Ms.
Harper’s “own understanding of copyright law—or lack thereof—
is irrelevant in the context of § 402(d)” and that she could not
overcome the notice limitation in § 402(d) because the copyright
holder placed appropriate copyright notice on the published song
recordings and that these notices were accessible to the public. 5
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 6 Justice Alito dissented,
arguing that certiorari should have been granted to address whether
notice that has been published on phonorecords should apply to
copyright infringement cases involving music downloaded from
the Internet. 7
The reasoning underlying Justice Alito’s dissent highlights an
important question: should notice of copyright displayed on
compact discs (CDs) or other physical media apply to music
3

Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 590, 178 L. Ed. 2d 511 (2010) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
504(c)(2) (2006)).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 199.
6
Id.
7
Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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transferred from these media and ultimately downloaded without
the notice?
I. BACKGROUND
A. Digital Downloading
The manner in which consumers legally purchase music has
changed dramatically over the last 20 years. No longer do the vast
majority of consumers buy CDs and records at brick-and-mortar
stores. Now, because of the omnipresence of the Internet and
increased use of smart phones and portable digital music players,
more consumers are purchasing music through websites and
electronic services like iTunes and the Amazon MP3 store. In
2012, digital music sales surpassed physical CD sales, accounting
for more than 37 percent of all album purchases during the 2012
calendar year. 8
Digital music distribution is popular because purchase and
storage is convenient. For example, iTunes users need only set up
an account and choose a payment method before they can purchase
a song or album from a massive, searchable music database. To
purchase, the consumer simply clicks the purchase button located
near the song or album, and the software automatically downloads
the digital song file onto the user’s hard drive and charges the
purchase price to the user’s account. The process is nearly identical
whether a consumer uses a personal computer or a smart phone or
other mobile device to download the music. Online piracy has
become easier and more user-friendly as well, with peer-to-peer
networks and unauthorized download websites offering a plethora
of musical works, and many savvy online denizens have
downloaded music without purchasing it in any form.

8

Drew Garini, Music Sales in 2012 Prove Digital is rising, CDs are Dead
and … Vinyl Is Alive Once Again, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/music-sales-2012-digitalphysical_n_2440380.html.
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B. The Innocent Infringer Defense in Copyright Law
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants the owner of a
copyright in a musical composition or sound recording the
following exclusive rights: “(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; [and] (3) to distribute phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . .” 9 If another person
does any of these things without authorization, that person has
infringed the copyright. Defendants may be liable for copyright
infringement whether they intended to infringe the copyright or
not, so typically the defendant’s state of mind is irrelevant.10
Successful plaintiffs in a copyright infringement case may elect to
recover actual damages or statutory damages. 11
If an individual knows or should have known that his or her
actions constitute infringement, courts will treat the violator as a
willful infringer. 12 Willful infringers may be subject to statutory
damages between $750 and $30,000 per violation. 13 However, if
the infringer can show that he or she “‘was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement,’
then the minimum statutory damages per violation are $200.” 14
This is known as the innocent infringer defense.
There is an exception to the innocent infringer defense,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 402(d), which can apply to infringement
cases involving recorded music:
If a notice of copyright in the form and position
specified by this section appears on the published

9

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
11
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
12
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that a defendant willfully infringes if the defendant “knows his actions
constitute an infringement”); Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing
Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that actual or constructive
knowledge is enough for a court to find willful intent).
13
17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(1) (2006).
14
17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2) (2006).
10
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phonorecord or phonorecords to which a defendant
in a copyright infringement suit had access, then no
weight shall be given to such a defendant's
interposition of a defense based on innocent
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory
damages . . . . 15
There is no question as to whether the § 402(d) exception
applies to copyright cases involving physical phonorecords marked
with appropriate notice of copyright. But does this statute—
adopted in 1988, well before the advent of widespread
downloading of music from the Internet—apply to copyright cases
involving Internet downloads? 16
II. MAVERICK RECORDING CO. V. HARPER
In Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, Maverick Recording
alleged that Whitney Harper, a 16-year-old girl, violated copyright
law by illegally downloading 544 songs to her computer. 17 In its
motion for summary judgment, Maverick asked for injunctive
relief and requested minimum statutory damages of $750 for each
of 37 songs at issue in the case. 18 Ms. Harper claimed that she was
an innocent infringer, arguing she did not understand the nature of
file-sharing programs and that she believed that listening to music
from file-sharing networks was akin to listening to a non15

17 U.S.C. § 402(d) (emphasis added). There are several exceptions to this
provision. Under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), “[t]he court shall remit statutory
damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for
believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section
107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational
institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment
who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which infringed by
reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public broadcasting
entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit activities of a
public broadcasting entity (as defined in § 188(f)) infringed by performing a
published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a transmission program
embodying a performance of such a work.”
16
See Berne Convention Implementation Act, § 7, 102 Stat. 2857.
17
Harper, 598 F.3d at 194.
18
Id. at 195.
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infringing Internet radio station. 19 The district court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the 37 claimed
incidents of copyright infringement, but denied its request for
statutory damages, ruling there were genuine issues of material fact
as to whether Ms. Harper was an innocent infringer. Reserving its
right to appeal the district court's decision on the applicability of
the innocent infringer defense, Maverick moved for entry of
judgment in the amount of $200 for each infringed work, the
minimum amount imposed upon an innocent infringer. 20 The court
granted Maverick’s motion.
Ms. Harper appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that she did
not infringe Maverick’s copyrights and that the Copyright Act’s
damage provisions violated her constitutional right to due process.
Maverick cross-appealed, arguing that as a matter of law, under §
402(d), Ms. Harper could not raise the innocent infringer
defense. 21
In its decision, the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Maverick on
the issue of the innocent infringer defense. The court held that Ms.
Harper could not raise the defense as a matter of law, reasoning
that proper copyright notice had appeared on CDs that included the
downloaded songs and were sold to the public. Because notice was
publicly available, Ms. Harper could not claim the innocent
infringer defense, even if she had not actually encountered the
notice. 22 Relying on the “historical structure of copyright law,” the
court implied that it was irrelevant that Ms. Harper may not have
personally seen the copyright notices because the “lack of legal
sophistication cannot overcome a properly asserted § 402(d)
limitation to the innocent infringer defense.” 23

19

Id. at 198.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
21
Harper, 598 F.3d at 195.
22
Id. at 199.
23
Id. The court noted that § 402(d) was amended by the Berne Convention
Implementation Act (BCIA), and is in large part responsible for “preserv[ing] an
incentive for use of the same type of copyright notice” by barring the innocent
infringer defense in disputes involving copyright plaintiffs who have provided
copyright notice. Given this, the court did not see how it could make sense “for
a copyright defendant's subjective intent to erode the working of § 402(d).”
20
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While at least one court has expressly held 24 that downloaded
files fall within the § 101 definition of “phonorecord,” 25 the Fifth
Circuit did not consider this issue. Instead, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that § 402(d) barred Ms. Harper from claiming the
innocent infringer defense, implying that although Ms. Harper did
not actually see the particular “material object” at issue marked
with a copyright, she could have easily discovered that the music
she downloaded was marked in another format with proper
copyright notice as described in § 402(a), (b) and (c).
Ms. Harper filed a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. On November 29, 2010, the Court denied her
petition. 26 Justice Alito filed a dissent.
III. JUSTICE ALITO’S DISSENT
Justice Alito believes a “strong argument” can be made that
§ 402(d) does not apply to downloaded digital music files. 27 As he
points out in his dissent, the law “was adopted in 1988, well before
digital music files were available on the Internet.” Considering the
new and different methods of distribution, it may not be prudent to
assume a digital downloader has seen any material object bearing a
copyright notice. Alito noted that while the concept behind
§ 402(d) “appears to be that a person who copies music from a
material object bearing the prescribed copyright notice is deemed
to have ‘reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement’ . . .[an individual who] downloads a digital music
file generally does not see any material object bearing a copyright

24

See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D.
Mass. 2008) (“The electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate
segment of the hard disk) is . . . a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of the
statute.”).
25
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines phonorecords as “material
objects in which sounds . . . are fixed . . . and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
26
Harper, 598 F.3d at 193.
27
Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590, 590–591, 178 L. Ed.
2d 511 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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notice.” 28 Thus, Alito supposed an argument could be made that
§ 402(d) does not apply. If this were the case, Alito thought, “the
question would simply be whether the infringer ‘was . . . aware and
had . . . reason to believe,’ § 504(c)(2), that the downloading was
illegal.” 29
Furthermore, Justice Alito reasoned that the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling did not discuss what sort of inquiry a person who downloads
digital files is required to make in order to preserve the innocent
infringer defense, and he wondered whether online research or
seeking out CDs at a local store would suffice. Finally, Alito
questioned whether age and lack of legal sophistication should be
“relevant considerations.” 30
In short, Justice Alito was not convinced that the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling provided adequate clarification or guidance on the
relationship between notice and the downloading of digital music,
and he questioned “whether the decision correctly interprets
§ 402(d).” 31
IV. ANALYSIS
In his dissent, Justice Alito raises an interesting question:
should a law effectively barring the innocent infringer defense, and
which was enacted before digital music files became available on
the Internet, be applied in a digital music download copyright
case? There are strong arguments supporting both an affirmative
and negative answer.
A. Argument against Barring the Defense
With the advent of personal digital music players and improved
access to computers and smart phones, an increasing number of
individuals are obtaining music exclusively from the Internet.
Given this, it seems unfair to assume digital music users have
purchased or even seen a CD or other packaged phonorecord on
28

Id.
Id.; see also Berne Convention Implementation Act, § 7, 102 Stat. 2857.
30
Harper, 131 S. Ct. at 590–591 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31
Id.
29
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which notice of copyright is displayed. 32 In addition, although
music purchased through iTunes or other legal online distribution
platforms include metatags containing notice of copyright, music
downloaded from other sources may not, as those tags can be
removed or altered, meaning that those who download these types
of files may be completely unaware of any copyright liability.
Despite the fact that many online downloaders never see a
copyright notice in any form, other courts have used reasoning
similar to the Fifth Circuit’s in Harper and have denied the
innocent infringer defense in online music purchase cases. For
example, in BMG Music v. Gonzalez, a defendant accused of
illegally downloading 1,370 songs claimed to be trying the music
before buying. 33 The Seventh Circuit held that this was not a fair
use of the copyrighted material and that the defendant had no claim
of innocent infringement under § 402(d) because she had access to
records and CDs bearing the proper copyright notice. 34 The court
reasoned that the defendant “could have learned, had she inquired,
that the music was under copyright.” 35
It seems unfair for courts to make this assumption on behalf of
digital downloaders, as it puts a serious burden on each individual
downloader to seek out notice of copyright for potentially every
music file they access. As Justice Alito pointed out in his dissent,
the Fifth Circuit was silent with respect to the kind of inquiry a
person must make to preserve an innocent infringer defense.

32

Thirty-three percent of Internet users have paid to download music
online. Eric Shonfeld, Pew Shows 65% of People Pay For Digital Content;
Mostly Music, Software, and Mobile Apps, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/30/pew-65-percent-pay-digital-content.
In
addition, digital platforms account for around 20 percent of global music sales,
yet an estimated 95 percent of all downloaded music is illegally downloaded.
IFPI Communications, Digital Music Report 2009: New Business Models for a
Changing Environment 4–5 (Jan. 2009), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/
DMR2009-real.pdf.
33
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005)
34
Id. at 892 (7th Cir. 2005).
35
Id.
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B. Argument for Barring the Defense
On the other hand, it is fair to question how “innocent” digital
users really are when copyright infringement notices are
commonly placed on legal phonorecords. Given the holding in
BMG, the media scrutiny on copyright issues involving piracy on
the Internet, and the fact that so many individuals have used webbased download services 36 for which they are required to
acknowledge a licensing agreement prior to use, it is hard to
imagine most individuals being unaware that music is covered by
copyright. Even such websites as ISOhunt, where users can
illegally download music, acknowledges legal threats concerning
their services, 37 making it probable that users of these sites are at
least minimally aware that legal issues exist over the material they
choose to download.
CONCLUSION
The questions about how “innocent” digital infringers really
are, and the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to address the topic
once and for all, have only added to the confusion over how notice
of copyright should apply in the digital music world. While the
Supreme Court declined to address these issues when it declined to
hear Harper, as splits develop in the circuit courts, the Court may
have another opportunity to consider the issue soon. Given the
scope of the problem, perhaps Congress should amend § 402 and
clarify the applicability of the innocent infringer defense to online
music downloaders.
It is clear that important questions remain as to whether § 402
36

iTunes had over 200 million accounts as of 2011. See MG Siegler, Apple
Now Has 200 Million iTunes Accounts, Biggest Credit Card Hub on Web,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 2, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/02/apple-200million-itunes-accounts.
37
IH, 10 years of isoHunt, past and future, (Jan. 22, 2013, 5:02 AM),
isoHunt http://isohunt.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=903673. Another popular
downloading website, The Pirate Bay, has a webpage devoted specifically to
responses to legal inquiries concerning illegal downloading. The Pirate Bay,
Legal Threats against The Pirate Bay, http://thepiratebay.se/legal (last visited
May 1, 2013).
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should apply to music downloaded from the Internet or peer-topeer distribution platforms. One is left to wonder why Congress
and the Supreme Court have failed to address it, and when they
might recognize, as Justice Alito suggests, that it is time to clear up
the confusion.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Defense attorneys attempting to establish an innocent
infringer claim in a downloaded-music copyright
infringement case should highlight Justice Alito’s dissent.



Defense attorneys in such cases should stress that courts are
unclear as to the type of inquiry required of a consumer
who downloads digital files.



Plaintiffs in these cases can point to the prevalence of
information on the Internet about copyright in music (for
example, user agreements on digital distribution platforms
such as iTunes, and information provided by illegal musichosting websites, news media, and blogs) to show that
regardless of whether a defendant has ever purchased a
physical CD or legal music download, he or she should be
well aware that downloading digital music without
permission is unlawful.



Congress should step in and clear up this area of the law.

